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Objective: At present emotional experience and implicit emotion regulation (IER) abilities
are mainly assessed though self-reports, which are subjected to several biases. The
aim of the present studies was to validate the Clock’N test, a recently developed time
estimation task employing emotional priming to assess implicitly emotional reactivity
and IER.
Methods: In Study 1, the Clock’N test was administered to 150 healthy participants
with different age, laterality and gender, in order to ascertain whether these factors
affected the test results. In phase 1 participant were asked to judge the duration of
seven sounds. In phase 2, before judging the duration of the same sounds, participants
were presented with short arousing video-clip used as emotional priming stimuli. Time
warp was calculated as the difference in time estimation between phase 2 and phase 1,
and used to assess how emotions affected subjective time estimations. In study 2,
a representative sample was selected to provide normative scores to be employed
to assess emotional reactivity (Score 1) and IER (Score 2), and to calculate statistical
cutoffs, based on the 10th and 90th score distribution percentiles.
Results: Converging with previous findings, the results of study 1 suggested that
the Clock’N test can be employed to assess both emotional reactivity, as indexed
by an initial time underestimation, and IER, as indexed by a progressive shift to time
overestimation. No effects of gender, age and laterality were found.
Conclusions: These results suggest that the Clock’N test is adapted to assess
emotional reactivity and IER. After collection of data on the test discriminant and
convergent validity, this test may be employed to assess deficits in these abilities in
different clinical populations.
Keywords: emotional disorders, priming effect, skin conductance, time estimation, neuropsychological test
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the disparate number of definitions (Kleinginna and
Kleinginna, 1981), it is widely accepted that emotions are
complex sets of reactions consisting of three components: (1) a
behavioral/expressive component, indexed by emotional
behaviors and emotional facial and bodily expressions;
(2) a cognitive/experienced component, indexed by self-
reported emotional feelings; and (3) a physiological/autonomic
component, indexed by changes in the heart rate, electrodermal
response (or skin conductance), body temperature and
respiratory rate (Dimberg, 1987). These three emotion
components are often measured separately, and employing
different tests and tasks. For instance, the cognitive/experienced
component is mainly assessed though self-report instruments,
such as interviews or self-report questionnaires, which can
evaluate either the person’s emotional experience/reactivity
(self-reported perceived emotions) or her emotion regulation
(ER) abilities (ability to up- or down-regulate the perceived
emotions).
Separating these three components facilitates the study of
emotions. However, the distinction is artificial, and the three
elements are strongly interrelated and they influence each
others in several bidirectional ways. For instance, experiencing
emotions—such as fear—and displaying them through facial
expressions activates consistently the autonomic system, as
indexed, for instance, by an increase in skin conductance,
with more intense emotional experience resulting in increased
physiological activations (Christie and Friedman, 2004).
Similarly, adopting the facial expression of an emotion can
contribute to the feeling of the corresponding emotion (Buck,
1980), as well as to the activation of the corresponding
physiological system (Levenson et al., 1990). Thus, designing
tasks that can tap into several different components is an
important research priority.
In the present article, we will present normative data for a
recently developed instrument, the Clock’N test (Gros et al.,
2015). Based on an emotional priming time estimation task, this
test allows to assess implicitly the emotional experience and the
ER linked to the cognitive/experiential component of emotions,
while tapping into the physiological emotion component. In the
next sections, we will first describe the main tasks currently
employed tomeasure emotional experience and ER. Next, we will
describe how time estimation works, and how it is influenced by
emotions. Finally, we will briefly describe the Clock’N Test.
Emotional Experience
Emotional experience is usually assessed through self-report
rating scales in which the participant needs to assess to what
degree he is feeling specific emotions. For instance, based
on a categorical emotion approach (e.g., Ekman, 1992), the
Differential Emotions Scale (DES; Ouss et al., 1990), the Brief
Mood Inventory Scale (BMIS; Niedenthal and Dalle, 2001) and
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson
et al., 1988) consist of lists of emotional adjectives/emotions in
which the participant must rate, on a numeric scale, to what
extent he/she is feeling the corresponding emotion. Similarly,
based on a dimensional emotion approach (e.g., Russell, 1994),
the Pleasure Arousal Dominance scale (PAD; Mehrabian, 1996)
requires participants to rate their level of pleasure, activation
and dominance on a numerical scale. The Self-Assessment
Manikin scale (SAM; Bradley and Lang, 1994) measures the
same dimensions, but using non-numerical/non-verbal pictorial
assessment scale, thus overcoming some difficulties often
identified with the verbal scales (e.g., difficult to employ in
childhood and for cross-cultural studies).
Despite all these instruments are well validated and currently
employed in the clinical practice, they heavily rely on the person’s
self-awareness, and thus may be biased by the instructions and
the participant’s expectations.
Emotion Regulation
ER refers to the processes meant to influence the intensity,
duration and type of emotion experienced (Gross and
Thompson, 2007). ER permits flexibility in emotional responding
in accord with one’s momentary as well as one’s longer term
goals in any given situation. For instance, ER can be useful to
reduce the intensity and/or the duration of negative emotions,
such as anger (Kashdan et al., 2015) or sadness (Millgram et al.,
2015). ER comprises a set of different strategies, including for
instance attentional deployment, in which the attention is shifted
away or towards emotional aspects of a stimulus or situation
(Manera et al., 2014), cognitive reappraisal, in which people
change the way they think about a stimulus or situation in
order to reduce negative feelings (e.g., Gross, 1998; Ochsner
et al., 2002), and expressive suppression, in which people
hide their emotions so that someone watching them would
not know what they are feeling (Gross and Levenson, 1993;
Lévesque et al., 2003). A variety of classification systems exist for
emotion regulatory processes (e.g., Gross, 1998; Koole, 2009).
For the purposes of the present article, a distinction particularly
relevant is that described by Gyurak et al. (2011), referring
to explicit (effortful) vs. implicit (automatic) ER processes.
Following this classification, explicit emotion regulation (EER)
processes require conscious effort for initiation, demand some
level of monitoring during implementation, and are associated
with some level of insight and awareness. EER are studied by
asking participants to use a specific strategy, such as cognitive
reappraisal, attentional deployment or expressive suppression
to change the way they feel (Gross, 1998). EER abilities have
investigated in an extensive corpus of literature (for reviews,
see Gross, 2013), and through several tasks, ranging from
self-report questionnaires (e.g., the ER Questionnaire, Gross
and John, 2003), and the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness
Skills (KIMS; Baer et al., 2004) to informant reports (e.g., the
Weekly Coping Questionnaire, Khor et al., 2014), to naturalistic
observation and behavior coding (seeWeiss et al., 2014). Implicit
emotion regulation (IER) processes are believed to be evoked
automatically by the stimulus itself and run to completion
without monitoring and can happen without insight and
awareness. IER includes, among others, emotional conflict
adaptation, habitual ER, emotion regulatory goals and values,
and ER as a result of affect labeling (Gyurak et al., 2011),
Surprisingly, IER strategies have received much less attention
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in the literature (Gyurak et al., 2011). This is unfortunate, as
deficits in IER have important maladaptive consequences, as
shown by the functional impairment of patients with generalized
anxiety disorder (Etkin et al., 2010). Tasks employed to assess
IEM include a few self-report questionnaires (e.g., Gross and
John, 2003), and implicit tasks such as the emotional conflict
task, employed to assess emotional conflict adaptation (Etkin
et al., 2006). This is the emotional version of the classic Stroop
paradigm (Stroop, 1935), and assesses IER through a progressive
reduction in reactions times in trials in which there is a conflict
between the photograph of an emotional faces (e.g., fearful)
and the word (e.g., ‘‘happy’’) written over it. The emotional
conflict task has shown to be useful in clinical populations,
such as patients with social anxiety disorders (Etkin et al.,
2010). However, as the task relies on reaction times, it is not
suitable to pathological populations with motor deficits, such as
patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD), or to patients showing
a slowdown in response due to psychomotor problems, such as
affective deficits.
Time Perception and the Internal Clock
Theory
In Treisman (1963) elaborated his internal clock theory, which
is the basis of all the current models of time estimation. He
suggested to that our time measuring mechanisms can be
described as an internal clock consisting of an arousal-sensitive
pacemaker, which sends continuously and constantly pulses to a
counter. Themodel also involves a store of ‘‘reference’’ durations,
and a comparator mechanism. Subjective time estimations derive
from the comparison of values in the counter and in the store.
In this model, internal and external stimuli are supposed to
modify the activity of the internal clock by modifying the
activation of the physiological/arousal system, which affects the
activity of the peacemaker. For instance, arousing emotional
stimuli are supposed to speed up the pacemaker, which sends
more pulses to the counter, thus resulting in a subjective time
overestimation. Treisman’s internal clock model was remodeled
by Gibbon’s scalar theory (Gibbon et al., 1977, 1984). Gibbon
added to the basic architecture of Treisman’s model the idea of
a switch, which can stop the pulse count and can be activated
by attentional mechanisms, that is by cognitive factors. When
the switch is activated, it prevents the pulses to enter into the
accumulator, thus resulting in a time underestimation. Based
on this model, we can thus assume that duration judgments
reflect both a physiological, arousal-mediated component, and
a cognitive, attention-mediated component. Several studies
focused on divided attention have confirmed that, when
participant’s attention is captured away from the time estimation
task, it results in a time underestimation (Coull et al., 2004, 2011;
Buhusi andMeck, 2005; Ulrich et al., 2006; Shi et al., 2013; Henry
et al., 2015).
Effect of Emotions and Attentional
Processes on the Time Estimation
Consistent with the internal clock models, studies conducted so
far demonstrated that emotional stimuli can result either in a
time overestimation, either in a time underestimation depending
on whether the emotional arousal component or the attentional
cognitive component is prevailing (Lejeune, 1998; Elliott et al.,
2000; Burle and Casini, 2001).
The arousal-elicited time overestimation has been studied
since the 1960’s. Langer et al. (1961) were the first to show
that inducing anxiety (by exposing participants to a dangerous
situation) produced a temporal overestimation proportional to
the intensity of the perceived danger. Based on the internal
clock theory, it can be assumed that danger perception increases
the pacemaker pulse rate, which thus generates a higher
number of pulses that under normal conditions, resulting in
a time overestimation. Watts and Sharrock (1984) confirmed
these results studying patients suffering from arachnophobia.
Similarly, it has been shown that stressful situations (such as the
fear of electric shocks or of unpleasant social interactions) induce
duration overestimates (for a review, see Hancock and Weaver,
2005). Also, several studies showed that stimuli depicting
negative emotions are perceived as longer in duration compared
to neutral stimuli (Wittmann et al., 2010; Grommet et al., 2011;
Gil and Droit-Volet, 2011; for reviews, see Gil and Droit-Volet,
2012; Gros et al., 2015). Interestingly, the overestimation effect
is stronger when emotions are presented in the context of a
social interaction (Thayer and Schiff, 1975), thus suggesting
that emotion-elicited time overestimates is not found only in
laboratory settings, but can be reproduced in real-life situations.
Recent studies have also confirmed the involvement of the
attentional system in emotion-related time estimates (Zakay,
1989; Zakay and Block, 1996; Liu et al., 2015). It has been
repeatedly shown that the more our attention is captured by
relevant aspects of a stimulus/situation, the more the time seems
short (Macar et al., 1994). Angrilli et al. (1997), using emotional
pictures, showed that the duration of highly arousing, unpleasant
pictures was overestimated, whereas the duration of highly
arousing pleasant pictures was underestimated. Inversely, when
employing low arousing pictures, the duration of unpleasant
pictures was underestimated, while the duration of pleasant
pictures was overestimated. The authors interpreted this opposite
direction of the valence effect as a function of arousal as evidence
that two different mechanisms are involved: an attention-driven
mechanism for low arousal, and an emotion-driven mechanism
for high arousal. Also, Droit-Volet et al. (2010) showed that
the duration of musical excepts was underestimated compared
to the duration of neutral sounds, possibly due to the fact
that music captures the attentional system more consistently.
Zélanti and Droit-Volet (2012) have recently shown that children
become more accurate in estimating the duration of sounds
earlier compared to what occurs for images, a result which
has been interpreted as evidence that visual stimuli engage the
executive attentional system more consistently than auditory
stimuli.
The Priming Paradigm and the Clock’N
Test
The priming paradigm is ideal to explore emotional processing
in an implicit way, thus minimizing the role played by
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 February 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 8
Gros et al. The Clock’N Test
self-awareness and other high-level cognitive factors. The
priming paradigm consists of presenting two stimuli sequentially,
and observing the influence of the first (the prime) on the second
(the target). Based on this paradigm, Gros et al. (2014, 2015)
recently developed the The Clock’N Test, an emotional-priming
time estimation task which was designed to study implicitly the
effects of arousal-mediated and attention-mediated mechanisms
on time estimation. In this test, participants have to estimate
the duration of a neutral sound through a classical temporal
bisection task (see below). Critically, the presentation of the
sound is preceded by the presentation of emotional priming
stimuli. In the first study, Gros et al. (2014) used olfactory stimuli
as priming stimuli, which are well known to activate consistently
the arousal system (Bensafi et al., 2002). Accordingly, they found
an increase in skin conductance after the odor presentation,
which was associated to a sound duration overestimation for all
the presented stimuli, thus confirming that odors engaged the
arousal-system consistently for the entire duration of the task (see
Figure 1).
In their next study, Gros et al. (2015) compared the
effect of odors and emotional videos priming stimuli.
Confirming previous findings, odors resulted in a constant
increase in skin conductance, accompanied by a constant time
overestimation for the entire duration of the task. Interestingly,
when videos were employed as priming stimuli, an initial
increase in skin conductance was accompanied by sound
duration underestimation. Critically, the level of physiological
activation decreased progressively from the first to the last
presented stimulus and was associated to a progressive shift
from time underestimation to time overestimation. The results
were interpreted as evidence that, at the beginning of the
task, the emotional aspects of the videos captured consistently
attentional resource, thus resulting in a time underestimation
accompanied by high arousal. In terms of the internal clock
theory, even if the pacemaker was accelerating and sending more
pulses due to the emotional arousal, attentional mechanisms
activated the internal switch, thus preventing the pulses to
enter into the counter, and resulting in a time underestimation
(Tse et al., 2004; Zakay, 2005). After the presentation of
some stimuli, IER mechanisms reduced progressively the
attention devoted to the emotional aspects of the videos and
the participant’s arousal (which, however, never reached the
zero). This allowed to re-open the switch, thus allowing the
pulses to enter again into the counter, and to shift progressively
towards the classical emotion-elicited time overestimation (see
Figure 2).
In summary, even if evidence on discriminant and convergent
test validity are still lacking, the task employing emotional
videos as priming stimuli has been suggested to be useful
to assess implicitly: (a) emotional reactivity, as indexed by
the time underestimation observed in the first part of the
task (and accompanied by high arousal), consequence of the
attention devoted to the emotional aspects of the videos; and
(b) IER abilities, as indexed by the progressive shift from time
underestimation to time overestimation (accompanied by a
progressive decrease in arousal), consequence of the habituation
(reduction of the attention devoted) to the emotional aspects
of the videos. Due to its implicit format, this task could be
particularly suitable to study deficits in emotional reactivity
and ER in clinical populations, such as patients with brain
lesions affecting the arousal mechanisms (e.g., amygdala) or the
regulation mechanisms (e.g., prefrontal regions). However, in
order to be employed in the clinical practice, the test must be
first validated on healthy participants, and normative data must
be obtained for different categories of participants (e.g., males vs.
females, elderly vs. young persons, etc.).
FIGURE 1 | Clock’N test: effects of the introduction of an odor emotional prime on time estimation. (A) shows how time estimation works when no
emotional prime is introduced. When the sound starts, pulses sent by pacemaker start entering the accumulator, and when the sound stops pulses stored in the
accumulator (in the working memory) are compared to reference pulses stored in the long term memory. The comparator finds the same number of pulses in the
working memory and the long term memory, and provides precise time estimation. (B) shows how time estimation works when an emotional stimulus such as an
odor is presented as a priming stimulus before the time estimation task. When the sound starts the pacemaker, which is arousal-sensitive, starts to send pulses at a
higher rate compared to baseline. When the sounds stops the pulses stored into the accumulator in the working memory are compared to reference pulses stored in
the long term memory. As the number of pulses in the accumulator is higher compared to that found in the reference store, this results in a subjective time
overestimation.
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FIGURE 2 | Clock’N test: effects of the introduction of a emotional video prime on time estimation. (A) shows how time estimation works when an
emotional video stimulus is presented as a priming stimulus before the time estimation task. When the sound starts, the pacemaker, which is arousal-sensitive, starts
to send pulses at a higher rate compared to baseline, as it happens for the odor priming stimuli. However, as video stimuli strongly engage attentional resources
(devoted to the emotional aspects of the stimulus), the switch is activated, thus preventing pulses entering into the counter. When the sounds stops the pulses
stored into the accumulator (in the working memory) are compared to reference pulses stored in the long term memory. As the number of pulses in the accumulator
is lower compared to that found in the reference store, it results in a time underestimation. (B) shows how time estimation works after adaptation to the emotional
video stimuli as a result of implicit emotion regulation (IER). Pulses are sent at the same rate as in (A), but attention is progressively shifted away from the emotional
aspects of the videos, thus allowing the switch to close later, and allowing more pulses entering into the counter. The result is that the comparator finds into the
counter more pulses compared to (A), but fewer compared to Figure 1A. The more the task goes on, the later the switch closes, thus allowing a progressive shift to
time overestimation.
The purpose of the present article is to present normative
data collected on a representative sample of healthy participants
for the Clock’N test (video task). Study 1 was designed
to replicate the results of Gros et al. (2015) on a bigger
(N = 150) and more representative sample of participants,
and to investigate the existence of effects of age, gender
and laterality on the task. Study 2 was designed, first, to
calculate meaningful scores to be employed in the clinical
practice as proxy for emotional reactivity and IER ability;
second, to provide psychometric indexes of the distribution
of these scores in a representative population of healthy
participants; and finally, to provide empirical cutoffs for these
scores.
STUDY 1
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
Ethics approval was granted by the Ethics Committee Est I
(France), and the study was labeled as non-interventional. A
statement was made to the National Commission for Computing
and Liberties by the Department of Clinical Research and
Innovation by the Hospital of Dijon. Statement Number:
1758780v0, April 2014.
Participants
One hundred and fifty healthy adults participated in this
study (68 M, 82 F; age range: 20–77 years; mean age:
46.5 years, SD: 17.0 years). They were all residents of the
Burgundy region (France), and their mother tongue was
French. One hundred and thirty three participants were right-
handed, 12 participants were left-handed, and the remaining 5
participants were ambidextrous. Twenty four participants had
less than 12 years of formal education (study certificate lower
than the French BAC), 55 had 12 years of education (BAC
certificate), 37 had 14 years of education (BAC+2 certificate),
and the remaining 34 had 16 years of education or more
(BAC+4 or more). Participants were not included if they had
pathologies causing cognitive impairment (e.g., brain tumor,
neurological disorder) and visual or auditory impairments.
The Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HDRS; Hamilton,
1980) was employed to evaluate the presence of depressive
symptoms.
Tasks and Design
Video priming stimuli
The video stimuli were selected from the tool developed by
Schaefer et al. (2010). We conducted pretests with more than
50 healthy participants, to select the films clips that were not
traumatizing, but still able to generate a consistent electrodermal
response. Seven films were selected: three films with positive
valence and four with negative valence. In the original study,
the valence (positive and negative) was assessed with a validated
French translation (Gaudreau et al., 2006) of the PANAS
(Watson et al., 1988). For each of the 20 emotion-related words,
participants used a 5-point scale (1: ‘‘very slightly or not at
all’’, 5: ‘‘extremely’’) to rate the extent to which they felt each
emotion as they were watching the film clip. The selected video-
stimuli were previously employed as priming stimuli by Gros
et al. (2015), who confirmed that all the stimuli were arousing,
and were able to produce a significant effect on target sound
stimuli.
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Target sounds employed for the time estimation task
The auditory stimuli employed for the time estimation task were
generated with the software PRATT (LF-ARX model). This is
an algorithm for the sound analysis/synthesis able to produce
different voice components which has often been employed
to explore the acoustic components associated to different
emotions. Critically, the software allows generating pure sounds
with the desired frequency and intensity. For the purposes of the
present study, we selected a pure sound, which has the advantage
of not being associated to any personal experience, as it does not
exist in nature. The same sound was generated in seven different
durations all shorter than 2 s (0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6 s).
Indeed, we know that for sounds longer than 2 s we can use
other strategies, such as counting, to increase the time estimation
accuracy (Burle and Casini, 2001).
Experimental Design and Procedure
The study took place in a temperature controlled and well
ventilated room at the Exploration Lab Nervous System of Dijon
(France). The experiment consisted of two phases occurring
sequentially. In the first phase (phase 1), we determined a time
judgment baseline for each participant, as duration judgments
are known to vary consistently across individuals, and are
affected by multiple factors (e.g., time of the day, age, sex,
attention; Lejeune, 1998; Bschor et al., 2004; Droit-Volet et al.,
2007). In the second phase (phase 2), we explored whether
the subjective time judgment varied with the presentation of
olfactory or visual priming stimuli.
Phase 1: subjective time estimation
As temporal distortions can be caused by several factors,
including individual differences (Bschor et al., 2004; Droit-Volet
et al., 2007), before starting the task we create a subjective time
estimation baseline for each participant, by asking the participant
to judge the duration of the same sounds presented later in
the priming task. Similarly we collected the basic electrodermal
response of each participant because they can vary depending on
many factors (such as age, sex, health status, etc.).
Participants were presented with a paper sheet with a 20 cm
line with three anchor points indicating 0, 1 and 2 s. Before
starting the time estimation task, participants were presented
with two sounds of 1 and 2 s, to give them standard reference
points. Participants were then presented with seven sounds of
400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400 and 1600 ms in the following
order: 1400, 600, 1200, 400, 800, 1000 and 1600 ms. The
task progression was the same for all participants. After each
sound, participants were asked to bisect the line in front of
them to indicate the estimated duration of the sound. They
were given no feedback on their performance. These estimates
were used as a baseline for the time estimation made in
Phase 2.
Phase 2: priming task with video stimuli
Participants were asked to watch a short video-clip. After 300 ms
from the video presentation (Hermans et al., 2001), participants
were presented with a target sound and asked (after 100 ms)
to estimate its duration with the same line bisection procedure
used in Phase 1. The time interval between two different trials
was one and a half minutes and equivalent across conditions.
The procedure was repeated seven times, with seven different
videos and the seven sounds employed in Phase 1 (presented
in the same randomized order as in Phase 1; see Figure 3).
Participants were not asked to provide ratings on the emotional
priming stimuli because this would have focused their attention
to the emotional aspects of the task. They were given no feedback
on their performance at any time. The whole task took around
15–20 min to complete.
Data Analysis
In order to obtain unbiased measures of time estimation, we
calculated for each stimulus: (1) the baseline time estimation,
i.e., the difference between time estimation provided in phase 1
and the real sound duration; (2) the emotional priming time
estimation, i.e., the difference between time estimation provided
in phase 2 and the real sound duration; and (3) the time
warp, i.e., the difference between the time estimation provided
in Phase 2 and the time estimation provided in Phase 1.
The baseline time estimation, the emotional priming time
estimation and the time warp were then submitted to a
repeated-measure ANOVA with task progression (from the
FIGURE 3 | Summary of the Clock’N test phase 2 procedure.
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1st to the 7th presented stimulus) as a within-subject variable
and age (19–39 years, 40–60 years and 61–81 years), gender
(male vs. female) and laterality (right-handed, left-handed and
ambidextrous) as between-subject factors. The ANOVA linear
contrast was also reported. Statistical analyses were performed
using SPSS 20.0 (IBM).
Results
Baseline Time Estimation (Phase I)
A single sample t-test (test value = 0) conducted on the
mean baseline time estimation (mean difference between
time estimation provided in phase 1 and the real sound
duration for the seven stimuli) revealed that, as a group,
participants had a slight tendency to underestimate the
sound durations (M = −1.01, SD = 2.46, t(149) = −5.04,
p < 0.001). A repeated measures ANOVA on the baseline
time estimation with task progression as within-subjects
factor revealed a significant effect of task progression
(F(6,894) = 41.89, p < 0.001), with the baseline time estimation
decreasing linearly from the first to the last presented
stimulus (linear contrast, F(1,149) = 103.56, p < 0.001; see
Figure 4).
Effect of age, gender and laterality
A repeated measures ANOVA on the baseline time estimation
with task progression as within-subjects factor and age
(19–39 years, 40–60 years and 61–81 years), gender (male
vs. female) and laterality (right-handed, left-handed and
ambidextrous) as between-subject factors confirmed the
significant effect of task progression (F(6,810) = 7.23, p < 0.001),
with the baseline time estimation decreasing linearly from the
first to the last presented stimulus (linear contrast, F(1,135) = 6.13,
p < 0.001). No main effect of age (F(2,135) = 0.63, p = 0.534),
Gender (F(1,135) = 0.25, p = 0.620) or laterality (F(2,135) = 0.06,
p = 0.947) was found. A significant interaction between task
FIGURE 4 | Time estimates for Phase 1 and Phase 2 (difference
compared to real sound duration).
progression and age was found (F(12,810) = 1.84, p = 0.039), with
participants in the intermediate age group (40–60 years) showing
a less linear decrease of the baseline time estimation compared
to younger and older participants. No other interaction reached
statistical significance (all ps> 0.193).
Emotional Priming Time Estimation (Phase 2)
A single sample t-test (test value = 0) conducted on the mean
emotional priming time estimation (mean difference between
time estimation provided in phase 2 and the real sound duration
for the seven stimuli) revealed that, as a group, participants had
a tendency to underestimate the sound durations (M = −1.94,
SD = 2.77, t(149) = −8.59, p < 0.001). A repeated measures
ANOVA on the baseline time estimation with task progression
as within-subjects factor revealed a significant effect of task
progression (F(6,894) = 28.26, p < 0.001), with the baseline
time estimation increasing linearly from the first to the last
presented stimulus (linear contrast, F(1,149) = 34.24, p < 0.001;
see Figure 4).
Effect of age, gender and laterality
A repeated measures ANOVA on the emotional priming
time estimation with task progression as within-subjects factor
and age (19–39 years, 40–60 years and 61–81 years), gender
(male vs. female) and laterality (right-handed, left-handed
and ambidextrous) as between-subject factors confirmed the
significant effect of task progression (F(6,810) = 2.71, p = 0.013),
with the baseline time estimation decreasing from the first to the
last presented stimulus. No main effect of age (F(2,135) = 1.02,
p = 0.363), Gender (F(1,135) = 0.07, p = 0.792) or laterality
(F(2,135) = 0.70, p = 0.496) was found. No two-way or three-way
interaction reached statistical significance (all ps> 0.177).
Time Warp (Phase 2 Minus Phase 1)
The time warp (difference between time estimation provided
in phase 2 and phase 1) divided by age, gender and laterality
is reported in Figure 5. A single sample t-test (test value = 0)
conducted on the mean time warp revealed that, as a group,
participants had a slight tendency to underestimate the sound
durations after emotional priming (M = −0.94, SD = 2.41,
t(149) = −5.40, p < 0.001). This is in line with the results
obtained in our study report employing the same stimulus
material. In line with the results of Gros et al. (2015), a repeated
measures ANOVA on the time warp with task progression
as within-subjects factor revealed a significant effect of task
progression (F(6,894) = 59.79, p < 0.001), with the time warp
increasing linearly from the first to the last presented stimulus
(linear contrast, F(1,149) = 137.20, p < 0.001). In order to check
whether the time warp change was driven by the duration of
the target sounds, we recomputed the ANOVA ordering the
stimuli based on the target sound duration (from the shorter,
400 ms, to the longer, 1600 ms). The linear contrast using the
duration of the target sounds as a ordering variable was not
statistically significant (F(1,24) = 0.12, p = 0.733), thus suggesting
than the presentation order, and not the duration of the target
sounds, was indeed the critical variable in generating the time
warp shift.
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FIGURE 5 | Mean time warp for Study by (A) Age, (B) Laterality, and (C) Gender.
Effect of age, gender and laterality
A repeated measures ANOVA on the time warp with task
progression as within-subjects factor and age (19–39 years,
40–60 years and 61–81 years), gender (male vs. female)
and laterality (right-handed, left-handed and ambidestrous)
as between-subject factors confirmed the significant effect of
task progression (F(6,810) = 7.99, p < 0.001), with the time
warp increasing linearly from the first to the last presented
stimulus (linear contrast, F(1,135) = 13.88, p < 0.001). No
main effect of age (F(2,135) = 0.28, p = 0.753; Figure 1A),
gender (F(1,135) = 0.02, p = 0.900; Figure 1B) or laterality
(F(2,135) = 0.63, p = 0.535; Figure 1C) was found. A
significant interaction between task progression and age was
found (F(12,810) = 2.18, p = 0.011)1, thus confirming all the
research suggesting a change in the emotional process during
age. No other interaction reached statistical significance (all
ps> 0.174).
Age. Contrary to what might have been expected from the
literature (Sims et al., 2015; Scheibe et al., 2015), we did not
1The results are the same if age (years) is used as a covariate in the Anova; no
main effect of age is found F(1,143) = 0.04, p = 0.836), while the interaction
between age and task progression is statistically significant F(1,143) = 5.88,
p = 0.017).
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find that older people had a faster shift to time overestimation
compared to younger people.
Gender. Even if not statistically significant, it is noteworthy that
the time underestimation at the beginning of the study was
more pronounced in women compared to men. These results are
consistent with previous reports that suggest a higher emotional
reactivity among women (McManis et al., 2001).
Laterality. Data inspection revealed that the performance
of the ambidextrous was clearly different from the right-
handed and left-handed participants, especially in the last three
stimuli, where they did not show any passage to a temporal
overestimation (the absence of statistical significance can be
explained by the low number of ambidextrous participants,
N = 5). This finding is consistent with the literature that
shows lower emotional reactivity in ambidextrous (Christman,
2014).
STUDY 2
Based on the data collected in Study 1, the objective of Study
2 was to establish normative scores for the Clock’N test, to be
employed in the clinical practice. As detailed in the introduction,
the task employing emotional videos as priming stimuli involves
(in our interpretation of the results) two different mechanisms:
(1) an attention-relatedmechanism (i.e., the attention is captured
by the emotional aspects of the video), which has a stronger effect
in the first phase of the task, and results in a time underestimation
associated to high arousal (as indexed by skin conductance,
see Gros et al., 2015); and (2) an implicit emotion-regulation
mechanism (IER, i.e., a decrease in the attention devoted to the
emotional aspects of the videos), which results in an progressive
shift from time underestimation to time overestimation over
the second part of the task, with a correspondent progressive
decrease in arousal.
The objective of the present study was to define two separate
scores to be used as proxies of individual emotional reactivity
and IER.
Participants
In order to obtain a sample representative of the general
population for age and gender, we referred to the INSEE data
(results collected until the end of 2014), and we randomly
selected from the sample collected in study 1 N = 137
participants, distributed as follows: 54 participants in the 19–39
years range (24 M, 30 F), 48 participants in the 40–60 years
range (24 M and 24 F) and 35 participants in the 61–81 years
range (16 M and 19 F). 20 participants had less than 12 years of
formal education (study certificate lower than the French BAC),
49 had 12 years of education (BAC certificate), 36 had 14 years
of education (BAC+2 certificate), and the remaining 32 had 16
years of education or more (BAC+4 or more). One hundred and
twenty five participants were right-handed, and 12 participants
were left-handed. Ambidextrous participants tested in Study 1
(N = 5) were excluded because they were too few, and because
data inspection revealed a different performance in the last part
of the experiment.
In order to check that the results found in Study 1 were
replicated in the new sample, we repeated all the data analyses
reported in the previous study on the new sample. No differences
were found between the full sample used in Study 1 and the
representative sample selected for Study 2.
Definitions of the Scores
In order to measure separately the two mechanisms of emotional
reactivity and EIR, we first analyzed when participants,
as a group, shifted from time underestimation to time
overestimation. For each participant, we first fitted a regression
line to the time warp data, putting the seven stimuli (ordered
based on the original task progression) on the y-axis (ordinate),
and the time warp on the x-axis (abscissa). We then calculated
the line intercept using the Microsoft Excel ‘‘Intercept’’ function,
to calculate the y-value (stimulus) for which the x (time warp)
was equal to zero. Descriptive analysis revealed that, for more
than 50% of participants, the passage from time underestimation
to time overestimation took place around the 4th presented
stimulus (M = 4.25, SD = 0.77; median = 4.23; see Figure 6). This
result is consistent with the results of our previous study (Gros
et al., 2015). Using the 4th stimulus as a cutoff, we then calculated
the two following scores:
Score 1: mean time warp among the first three presented
stimuli, which represents a measure of emotional reactivity;
lower scores indicates higher emotional reactivity.
Score 2: difference between the mean time warp in the last
three presented stimuli and score 1; higher scores indicates
stronger EIR skills, given the presence of emotional reactivity
(low score 1).
An alternative method to evaluate the EIR skills is to fit a
regression line to the individual time warp data (putting the
FIGURE 6 | Study 2: histogram showing when the shift from time
underestimation to time overestimation did occur.
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive analyses for score 1 and score 2.
Mean (SD) Range Skewness Kurtosis
(SE) (SE)
Score 1 cm −2.58 (2.84) −10.17–10.07 0.56 (0.21) 2.20 (0.41)
s −0.25 (0.28) −2.03
Score 2 cm 3.11 (3.30) −6.83–14.00 0.35 (0.21) 1.18 (0.41)
s 0.31 (0.33) −2.08
TABLE 2 | Clock’N test: normative data.
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Score 1 cm −6.04 −4.48 2.63 0.63 0.67
s −0.6 −0.45 0.26 0.06 0.07
Score 2 cm −0.71 1 2.77 5.12 6.95
s −0.07 0.1 0.28 0.51 0.69
time warp on the y-axis and the seven stimuli ordered based
on the original task progression on the x-axis) and calculate
the line slope (for instance with the Microsoft Excel function
‘‘slope’’). A higher slope indicates a faster shift from time
underestimation to time overestimation, and thus stronger EIR
skills. However, we decided to provide normative data only
concerning Score 1 and Score 2 because they are easier to
calculate, and thus can be used more extensively in the clinical
practice.
Normative Data
Descriptive analyses for score 1 and score 2 are reported in
Table 1. Single sample t-tests (test value = 0) confirmed that
Score 1 was significantly lower than zero (t(136) = −10.64,
p < 0.001) and that Score 2 was significantly higher than
zero (t(136) = 11.01, p < 0.001). Skewedness for both
Score 1 and Score 2 was lower than one, thus indicating
a symmetrical data distribution. Kurtosis values were above
one for both Score 1 and Score 2, thus indicating a
distribution slightly more peaked compared to a standard
Gaussian distribution. Finally, in order to crosscheck whether
age, gender and laterality had an effect on the two scores,
we submitted Score 1 and Score 2 to separate between-
subject ANOVAs with age (19–39 years, 40–60 years and
61–81 years), gender (Male vs. Female) and laterality (right-
handed vs. left-handed) as between-subject factors. Confirming
the results of Study 1, results revealed no significant effect
on Score 1 (corrected model: F(10,136) = 0.79, p = 0.636; Age:
F(2,126) = 0.82, p = 0.442; Gender: F(1,126) = 0.61, p = 0.438;
Laterality: F(1,126) = 0.13, p = 0.718) or Score 2 (corrected
model: F(10,136) = 0.85, p = 0.580; Age: F(2,126) = 0.46,
p = 0.630; Gender: F(1,126) = 0.40, p = 0.529; Laterality:
F(1,126) = 0.34, p = 0.561). For this reason, we did not provide
separate normative data for different age, gender and laterality
groups. Normative data on the time warp are presented in
Table 2.
As a rule of thumb, normative data for score 1 are usually
below zero (in 85, 1% of the participants in our sample), and
the normative data for score 2 are usually above 0 (in 86, 1%
of the participants in our sample). It should be noted that
score 2 is dependent on the results of score 1. Specifically,
if score 1 is above 0 (no emotional reactivity), score 2 (EIR
ability) should not be interpreted, as there was no emotion
to regulate. More in general, comparisons of scores 2 among
different individuals are meaningful only when their scores 1 are
similar.
Effect of Depressive Symptoms
In order to provide suggestions on the potential of the use
of the Clock’N test in clinical populations, we performed an
exploratory analysis to verify whether self-reported depressive
symptoms (as indexed by the HDRS, 17-item version) had
any effect on Score 1 and Score 2. ANOVA on score 1 with
Depression (score 0–4, 5–9 and >9) as between-subject factor
was not statistically significant (F(2,130) = 0.07, p = 0.933),
with the mean values for Score 1 being negative for the three
Depression categories (score 1 ranging from −2.34 to −2.57).
ANOVA on score 2 with Depression as between-subject factor
was not statistically significant (F(2,130) = 1.73, p = 0.181).
However, the mean values for participants scoring higher than
9 in the HDRS (N = 2) were negative (M = −1.18), while
they were positive, as expected, for participants scoring lower
than 9 (group 0–4, M = 3.07, group 5–9, M = 3.38). The
absence of statistical significance can be explained by the
low number of participants in the high depressive symptoms
group.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we reported normative data for the
Clock’N test (Gros et al., 2014, 2015), an instruments designed
to assess implicitly emotional reactivity and IER abilities, and
that has several potential application in the clinical practice.
In the first study, we replicated the results of Gros et al.
(2015) showing that, at the beginning of the task, participants
underestimated sound durations, due to the attention devoted
to the emotional aspects of the stimulus (Tse et al., 2004; Zakay,
2005).
In the terms of the internal clock theories, this effect of time
underestimation can be interpreted as evidence that the attention
devoted to the emotional videos closed the internal switch, thus
potentially preventing the pulses to enter the counter. This result
is consistent with the studies showing that stimuli capturing
attentional resources result in a time underestimation (e.g.,
Angrilli et al., 1997; Droit-Volet et al., 2007; Noulhiane et al.,
2007; Tipples, 2010; Liu et al., 2015). Specifically, it has already
been shown that complex visual stimuli consistently capture
attentional resources (Droit-Volet et al., 2010). This supports
the interpretation that the videos employed in the Clock’N
test captured attentional resources, especially at the beginning
of the task. Around the 4th presented stimulus, participants
showed a passage to time overestimation, which reflected the
effect of IER abilities, allowing to progressively disengaging the
attention from the emotional aspects of the stimuli, and thus
resulting in the classical arousal-elicited time overestimation.
The arousal-dependent time overestimation found at the end of
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the task is consistent with a number of previous studies. For
instance, taking medications with an exciting effect induces a
time overestimation (Meck, 1983; Wearden and Penton-Voak,
1995; Droit-Volet and Wearden, 2002). Studies employing audio
stimuli (Droit-Volet et al., 2010; Cocenas-Silva et al., 2011)
showed that musical excerpts with high arousal produced a
time overstimation. Similar results have been found for stimuli
presented in the visual modality (Nather et al., 2011; Gil
and Droit-Volet, 2012; Fayolle and Droit-Volet, 2014), which
systematically revealed that emotional pictures, which produced
an increase in arousal, were systematically judged as longer
compared to neutral pictures. In the terms of the internal clock
theory, the effect of IER allowed to progressively open the
switch, thus allowing the higher number of pulses induced by
the increased arousal to enter again into the counter. Thus,
the results of study 1 confirmed that the Clock’N test can
be employed to assess both emotional reactivity and IER.
Furthermore, in study 1 we showed that gender, laterality
and age did not significantly affect the results of the Clock’N
test. Despite these results were collected on a big sample of
participants (N = 150), future research should remain open to
the possibility of effects of age and laterality. Indeed, in the
present study we did not test participants older than 77 years,
and we know from literature that both emotional reactivity
and ER undergoes a number of changes across the lifespan
(e.g., Gosselin et al., 2002; Kalisch, 2012; Frankel et al., 2015;
Scheibe et al., 2015; Sims et al., 2015). Similarly, we tested
only five ambidextrous participants, and there is some evidence
that emotional processing and ER may vary depending on
the participant’s laterality (Christman, 2014; Rempala, 2014;
Costanzo et al., 2015). Future studies should investigate whether
including participants aged over 80 years and a more consistent
number of ambidextrous participants can modify this pattern of
results.
In study 2, we defined two separate scores to be used as
proxies of individual emotional reactivity (Score 1) and IER
(Score 2), and provided normative cutoffs for these two scores,
based on the 10th and 90th score distribution percentiles. These
cutoffs should allow clinicians to identify patients that have
an emotional reactivity too low (Score 1 > 0.67) or to high
(Score 1 < −6.04) compared to healthy participants, as well
as to identify patients whose IER abilities are too low (Score
2 < −0.71) or too high (Score 2 > 6.95). Exploratory analysis
confirmed that participants with reporting higher depressive
symptoms, which are well known to affect IER abilities (Belden
et al., 2015), had scores below the 10th percentile cutoff for
Score 2, thus suggesting that these values may be useful to
discriminate patients with specific impairments in IER. However,
future studies including a bigger number of participants with
high depressive symptoms are required to validate the provided
cut-offs. As we described in the ‘‘Results’’ section, score 2 is
dependent on the results of score 1. This means that, if score
1 is above 0 (no emotional reactivity), score 2 (EIR ability)
should not be interpreted, as there was no emotion to regulate.
This means that score 2 may not be adapted to test IER in
patients with problems of emotional reactivity, such as patients
with Alzheimer’s disease (AD; Lyketsos et al., 2002; Apostolova
and Cummings, 2008), PD (Tessitore et al., 2002) or patients
affected by stroke leading lesions of the basal ganglia (Onoda
et al., 2011) and of the temporal lobe (Okada et al., 1997). More
in general, comparisons of scores 2 among different individuals
are meaningful only when their scores 1 are similar. In the next
section, we will describe the categories of patients for which Score
1 and Score 2 may be more interesting to employ.
Limitations and Future Research
Directions
Despite our normative data were collected on a large and
representative sample of participants, some limitation should
be noted. First of all, we were unable to provide independent
measures of test validity. For instance, we did not provide any
measure for the test convergent validity (through correlation
with existing tests supposed to measure the same abilities), nor
for discriminant validity (through correlation with existing tests
supposed to measure different abilities). This is due to the fact
that, at present, there are no gold standards to assess experienced
emotional reactivity and IER abilities. More evidence on the test
validity needs to be collected to ascertain that the Clock’N test
is indeed measuring emotional reactivity and IER abilities, as
we suggest. This may be obtained by embedding the test in a
battery of validated tasks assessing different aspects of emotional
functioning. A second limitation is represented by the fact that
we did not include patients with emotional deficits, and therefore
we were unable to empirically verify the validity of the provided
measures and of the cutoffs in discriminating these patients. We
believe that it would be interesting to collect data on patients
with diverse types of emotional deficits. For instance, it would
be very interesting to test patients with brain lesions known to
affect emotional reactivity (e.g., amygdala lesions) and IER (e.g.,
prefrontal lesions).
Concerning Score 1 (emotional reactivity), it would be
interesting to test patients with brain tumors affecting the
anterior cingulate cortex, who show deficits in the classical
emotion recognition tasks (Baird et al., 2006). Using the Clock’N
test in combination with emotion recognition tasks would allow
to verify whether these two abilities are correlated, and to
what extent loosing the ability to recognize other’s emotions
relate to emotional reactivity. Patients with AD and PD would
also represent interesting targets. It is well known that these
patients are affected by apathy (Robert et al., 2006), and by a
lack of reactivity to emotional stimuli (Lyketsos et al., 2002;
Apostolova and Cummings, 2008). However, so far the deficits
in emotional reactivity have been investigated only though self-
reports (Bowers et al., 2006; Mograbi et al., 2012), which can lead
to possible biases. Employing the Clock’N test in combination
with the classical self-report measures would provide additional
evidence for the hypothesis of an emotional reactivity deficit
in patients with AD, and provide further evidence for the
validity of the Clock’N test. Apathy and emotional blunting have
also been reported in post stroke patients with basal ganglia
(Onoda et al., 2011) and temporal lobe (Okada et al., 1997)
lesions. The Clock’N test could allow verifying whether apathy
in these patients is actually related with a lack of emotional
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reactivity, as it is commonly assumed. Finally, another category
of interesting patients is represented by generalized anxiety
disorders and bipolar disorders, which are characterized by
emotional hyperactivity (Houenou et al., 2011), and thus would
allow to verify if the upper limits of Score 1 are valid.
In terms of implicit emotional regulation (Score 2), it would
be interesting to employ the Clock’N test in patients with
bipolar disorders, characterized by dysfunctions of the prefrontal
networks involved in ER (Phillips et al., 2003), and in patients
with anxiety disorders (Etkin et al., 2010). In addition to
psychiatric pathologies, ER deficits were also found in patients
who suffered from stroke (Cooper et al., 2015) or in patients with
tumors in the cerebellum (Hopyan et al., 2010).
Going beyond the classical self-report measures, we believe
that the Clock’N test may provide clinicians with an additional,
more objective measure to help detecting affective problems
potentially underestimated, especially in those pathological
populations for whom affective problems are not the key
symptoms. Further validation and research will help to clarify the
usefulness of this test in the clinical practice, and its potentials
in suggesting new treatment options for deficits in emotional
reactivity and ER.
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